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Abstract:
Environmental taxes can be an efficient instrument for
environmental protection. In fact, it is sometimes argued that
by usinq the revenues from environmental taxes to reduce
distortionary taxea on labor, governments can reap a'double
dividend,' namely, not only an improvement in environmental
quality, but also a reduction in the efficiency costs
associated with raising public revenue. By employing a general
equilibrium model, this paper finds that, contrary to common
wisdom, environmental taxes typically render the overall tax
system a less efficient instrument to finance public spending.
Furthermore, high estimates for the marginal efficiency coats
of existing taxes weaken, rather than strengthen, the case for
environmental taxes. To prevent environmental taxes from
raisinq the marginal efffciency costs of raisinq revenue, the
qovernment must either cut public spendinq or allow a chanqe
in the income distribution.
~7tu viars a:prasaad Ln thLs papaz ara stríetl~ parsonal. SFu~ do not naeaaaarLl~ rapraaen[
tha offiaial poaitlons of tha MinLatr~ of EeonomLC Affalrs Ln tha Ilatharlanda. Ya rould Lllu ta thaalc
SL brm Cnoasm, Jarl{ van SLadaran, Eerman Vo11aMr~h, Ed Yastarhout and an anon~eous rafaraa for
M~ptul caemants on an aarllar draft.1
1. introduction
In the face of qrowing concern about serious environmental
problems, envfronmental taxation has attracted increasinq
attention as taxes can, at least in principle, internalize the
external effects of environmental damaqe. Furthermore, many
economists have argued that environmental taxes are an
efficient instrument for achievinq environmental objectives
(see, e.q, Baumol and Oates (1988) and Pearce and Turner
(1990)).
Some have qone even further to suggeat that environmental
taxes may yield benefits over and above a cleaner environment;
by usinq the revenues from environmental taxes to decrease
other, distortionary taxes, the government can reduce the
overall economic costa of financing public spending. In this
way, it is argued, environmental taxes yield a'double
dividend'--not only a cleaner environment but also a less
diatortionary tax system. Indeed, hiqh estimates for the
marqinal efficiency costs of the existing tax system have been
put forward as an important arqument in support of
environmental taxea (see e.g. Goulder (1991)). To illustrate,
in advocating carbon taxes, Pearce (1991) presents estimates
for the deadweíqht losses of current tax systems.
The objective of this paper is to explore under which
conditíons environmental taxes do indeed reduce the efficiency
costs of financing public spending. To that end, it formulates
a simple qeneral equilibrium model of a small open economy.
The model is designed to examine the interaction between, on
the one hand, environmental taxes aimed at internalizing the
external effects from pollution, and, on the other hand,
distortfonary taxes on labor designed to finance public
spending. The model thus contains two distortions: first, an
environmental diatortion associated with the external effects
of pollution and, second, a distortion in the labor market on
account of a distortionary tax on labor income.
The model ia based on optimizing behavior at the micro-
economic level. Moreover, the quality of the natural
environment is included in the utility function. Accordingly,
the model is suited to perform welfare analysis and, in
particular, to examine the interaction between the2
environmental and labor market distortions in a'second best'
framework. In particular, the model reveals how the welfare
effects of environmental taxes depend on the magnitude of the
pre-existing tax distortions, which reflect the overall level
of public apending.
The model is solved analytically. The solutions explicitly
reveal how several major structural parametera impact the
effecta of environmental taxes. To illuatrate, the roles of
the initíal tax rates as well as various behavioral
elasticities are identified. The initial taxes on polluting
commodíties and labor income are directly related to the
magnitude of the distortions, while the elasticities measure
the sensitivity of behavior with respect to these distortions.
In particular, the model incorporates the following important
elasticities: the substitution elasticity in consumption
between polluting and non-polluting commoditiea, the wage
elasticity of labor supply, and the substitution elasticities
in production between polluting inputs, labor and capital
services.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
elaborates on the model. The next three sections present and
interpret the effects of an increase in environmental taxes
for the case where the revenues are used to reduce the tax
rate on labor income. In order to understand the basic
intuition behind the results, Section 3 examines the economic
effects if environmental taxes are introduced in an initial
equilibrium without any environmental taxes and also without
income from tranafers and financial wealth. The case with
initial environmental taxes but without income transfers and
domestic capital income is dealt with in Section 4, while
Section 5 assumes that income from public transfers and
financial wealth is positive but initial environmental taxes
are zero. Section 6 presents some suqqestions for extending
the model. Finally, Section 7 contains the main conclusions.3
2. The model
This section describes the main features of the model of a
small open economy contained in Table I. The notation is
explained at the end of this table.
Firm behavior: Droduction
A repreaentative firm supplies a single commodity. A constant-
returna-to-scale neo-classical production function (I.1)
describes domestic production. Besides labor and capital, a
third input enters the production function. This input causes
environmental damaqe when used in production. Accordingly, it
is called the 'pollutinq' input.
The first-order conditions (I.2), (I.3), and (I.4) repreaent
the implicit demande for, respectively, labor, capital, and
the pollutinq input. The production function assumes that
capital and the polluting input form a composite input before
combining with labor (see Figure I). The non-profit condition
(I.5) followa from the assumptions of constant returns to
scale, perfect competition, and profit maximization. Price
equations (I.6) and (I.7) link the prices faced by the firm
(the so-called 'producer' prices) to the market prices of
labor and the pollutinq input.
Household behavior: consumotion and labor suDOlv
Household behavior is derived from optimizing utility (I.8).
Households demand two consumption commodities. One of these
commodities--the so-called 'polluting' consumption commodity--
harms the environment when consumed. The other commodity is
called the 'non-pollutinq' consumption commodity.l The
substitution elasticity between the two consumption
commoditiea is denoted by aec.
in addition to these two consumption commodities, leisure and
environmental quality (i.e. environmental aervices) also enter
utility (Figure II). The environment is a collective good.
Accordingly, the representative household takes the quality of
the environment as given. It adopts the demands for leisure
and the two consumption commodities as instruments to optimize
1This commodity, however, may cause environmental damage when it is
produced.4
utility subject to a budget constraint (I.9). In particular,
private consumption is constrained by labor income, income
transfers provided by the government, and the part of capital
income that is not saved.2 In this static model, the stock of
financial wealth, saving behavior and, therefore, the growth
rate of fínancial wealth are exogenous. The implicit
expressions for labor supply and the demand for the two
consumption commodities are given by the first-order
conditions (I.10), (i.li), and (i.12). Equation (I.13) shows
that the environmental tax on the polluting commodity raises




The government budget is balanced (see (I.14)). Government
spendinq consists of two categories: transfer payments to
households and direct spending on public goods. The government
relies on three taxes to finance its spending: an ad-valorem
tax on labor income (which applies neither to transfer income
nor capital income) and two specific environmental taxes. one
of these latter taxea applies to the polluting consumption
commodity demanded by households. The other environmental tax
is levied on the demand by firms for the pollutinq input into
the production process.
International trade and labor-market equilibrium
All commodities (i.e. the polluting input, the two consumption
commodities, and the domestic output) are tradable.
Accordingly, their prices (before taxes) are determined on
world markets and are exogenous to the economy. Also the rate
of return on capital is exogenous to the small open economy
because capital ia perfectly mobile internationally.3 Labor,
in contrast, is assumed to be immobile. Accordingly, the wage
rate is the only price that is determined domestically.
Expression (I.15) denotes labor market equilibrium.
The balance-of-payments constraint (I.16) represents the
20n a balanced growth path, dynamic efficiency requires that savíng does
not exceed capítal income (see e.g. Abel et al (1989)). Under the golden rule,
capital income equala saving, as the real growth of the economy equals the
real rate of return on capital.
3Capital can also be interpreted as a tradable non-polluting input.5
budget constraint for the economy as a whole. The value of the
domestic production of tradables constrains overall domestic
demand for tradables. This constraint can be darived Prom
equilibrium on the labor market (I.15), the non-profit
condition (I.5), and the budqet constraints oP, respectively,
households and the government (i.e. (I.9) and (I.14)).
Envirorunental relationshios
Expreseion ( I.17) formalizea the inverse relationship between
the quality of the natural environment and the demand for,
respectively, polluting consumption commodities and polluting
inputs into production. This relationship raises spacial and
dynamic iasues. The atatic model abstracts from laqs between
economic activity and environmental damage associated with
stock-flow effects. If pollution crosses international
bordera, the link between, on the one hand, domestic
conaumption and production, and, on the other hand, the
quality of the domestic natural environment, is weakened.
Linearized model
This paper examines the local behavior of the amall open
economy around the initial equilibrium. To that end, the model
is log-linearized around the initial equilibrium.4 Table II
contains the log-linearized model. The notation is explained
at the end of the table.s A tilde (') denotes a relative
chanqe, unless indicated otherwise. The prices of the tradable
commodities and mobile capital are qiven from abroad. This
paper assumes that these exogenous variables do not change.
Appendix A solves the loq-linearized model for changes in
three exoqenous variables, namely, income transfers and the
two environmental taxes. In order to examine a change in the
tax mix, we assume that the government keeps its own spending
on public qooda conatant and adopts the (endogenous) tax rate
on labor to balance its budget.
The demend equation for capital (II.3) reveals that the
specification of the production functíon allows for
complementarity between capital and the polluting input. in
4This procedure is based on Keller (1980).
SAppendix C derives a number of relationships for the various shares in
domestic production in the initial equilibrium.6
particular, at a given level of production, a higher price for
the pollutinq input reduces the demand for capital if the
(partial) substitution elasticity between capital and the
polluting input in 'producinq' the composite input, oek, is
small compared to the substitution elasticity between labor
and that composite input, aln:
aek ~ al~ln
The loq-linearized expressions (II.10) and (II.il) indicate
that the income elasticities for the two consumption
commoditiea may differ from unity. However, weighted by their
budqet sharea, the income elasticities add up to one:
~r t a.h~ r- ~ ayQ ` a~ ` (a.z)
Labor supply (II.9) depends on the real after-tax waqe,pi,
real transfers, (5~ -~n1PQ) , and environmental quality,~`y.
Alternatively, one can write labor aupply in terms of the
compensated wage elasticity and the income effect as:
Le - eiiPi - 61~p - ~rM (2.3)
where bD stands for the effect on real private household
income defined as the sum of effects on the real after-tax
wage rate and the real value of income from tranefers and
financial wealth:
~p - (1-~nl)P1 t S~. (2.4)
where S' represents the effect on the real value of income
from transfers and financial wealth:
~~ - S~ - WnlP4 (2.5)
Labor supply may also negatively depend on environmental
quality if the substitution elasticity in utility between
environmental quality and the composite of the two private7
consumption commodities, aq, exceads the substítution
elasticity between leisure and the composite of the other
inpute into utility, a~. In that case, environmental quality
and leisure are complements: an improvement in environmental
quality boosts the marginal utility from leisure, thereby
reducing the incentives to supply labor. In the rest of this
paper, we abstract from this effect and assume that
environmental quality does not directly affect labor supply
(i.e. j a 0 because aq - a~).
The exceas burden
One can measure the welfare effacts of small policy changes by
the so-called marginal 'excesa burden'.6 This excess burden
corresponds to the additional income that needs to be provided
to the representative household to keep its utility at its
initial level (i.e. without the policy shock). Hence, a
positive value for the excess burden indicates a loss in
welfare. In order to provide more intuition for the welfare
effects, three alternative expressions for the excess burden
are presented.
The excess burden (as a ratio to initial household income PqQ)
~, can be written as the aum of effects on the environmental
and labor-market distortions:~
~ ~ - ( ~1 )L - ( pee -
~9,r,)Ëh - ( ~ot - H9mt)~f (2.6)
a~ a~ a~
The first term at the right-hand side of (2.6) stands for the
effect on the labor-market distortion, which is due to a
distortionary tax on labor income. In particular, the tax rate
óThis burden ia called the 'excesa' burden becauae it correaponds to the
loss in welfare over and above the revenues collected by the government. One
can interpret the coata dua to the exceas burden as the 'hidden' costs of
financing public spending because they are not reflected in tax revenue. One
may think that the aggregate burden on the public sector is lower if private
agenta succeed in avoldíng taxes by changing their behavior. However, thase
behavioral changes raise the overall costs of financing a given level of
public apending because they require higher taxes elsewhere. Hence, the
government is not able to compensate the private sector for the coats involved
in changing behavior.
~Thia expression for the 'marginal' excasa burden holds exactly only for
infinitely small changes ín taxes. It is an approximation for the welfare
effecta of larger changes. For a discussíon of welfare measurea, in general,
and the margínal exceas burden, in particular, aee Fullerton (1991).on labor income measures the marginal welfare qain associated
with an additional unit of employment. [This is because this
tax rate drives a wedge between the before-tax waqe paid by
the employer and the after-tax waqe received by the worker. At
the marqin, employers equate the before-tax wage to the
marginal product of labor, which represents the social
benefits of a marginal unit of labor. Workers equate the
after-tax wage to the marginal benefits from leisure, which
measures the social opportunity costs of one unit of labor.
Hence, the tax rate, which correaponds to the gap between the
before- and after-tax waqe, provides a measure for the wedge
between the social benefits and the social opportunity costs
of a marqinal unit of labor.J
Thus, if the tax rate on waqe income is positive, an expansion
of employment raises welfare. Intuitively, at the margin, the
social benefits of employment exceed the social opportunity
costs because the additional production from one additional
unit of labor not only compensates the worker for giving up
leisure but also yields tax revenue. Hence, by strengthening
the economic base of the public sector, employment yields a
public benefit to society over and above the compensation to
the private supplier of labor.
The last two terms at the riqht-hand side of (2.6) correspond
to the effects on the environmental distortions, which are due
to, respectively, pollution in consumption and in production.
The welfare effect of a marginal increase in the demand for
the polluting commodities ia given by the difference between,
on the one hand, a tax term, which measures the social
benefits of additional tax revenue due to a wider tax base,
and, on the other hand, the marginal social damage from
pollution. In the absence of environmental taxes (i.e. Beh -
Bef - 0), cutting the demand for the polluting commodities
enhances overall welfare because the social costa of pollution
exceed the social benefits. In the presence of initial
environmental taxes, a lower demand for polluting commodities
harms welfare ff the 'tax-base' effect exceeds the pollution
effect. If the tax rate is set to fully internalize the
external effects of pollution, the effect on the tax base
exactly offsets the social damage of pollution (i.e. (gei~opqt)
- nemi with i-h,f). In that case, the last terms at the right-
hand side are zero and a marginal change itt demand for the9
polluting commodities does not affect welfare. intuitively, a
hiqher demand for polluting commodities causes additional
social costs in terms of environmental damage, which are
exactly offset by the social contribution in terms of
additional tax revenue.
Sy rearranging the terms in expression (2.6), one can
alternatively display the excess burden ae the sum of an
effect on the tax base,~~, and an effect on the quality of the
environment, S':
S : -Fj~ - ~` je (i.7)
The effect on 'environmental' income,~e, can be separated into
the effects on environmental quality due to changes in
household- and firm behavior, respectively:
~' L -n [e„~h . em~`)
The 'tax-base' effect,b~, is defined by:
a~` L ~iL ; ~a~`h ~ 9Br~r
(z.a)
(2.9)
The three terms at the right-hand side of (2.9) stand for the
effects on the base of, respectively, the labor tax, the
environmental tax on household consumption, and the
environmental tax levied on firm input. Intuitively, the tax-
base effect represents the consequences of a different tax mix
for the efficiency of the tax system as an instrument to raise
revenue. In particular, an erosion of the tax base indicates
that the tax system becomes lesa efficient as a revenue-
raiaing device as hiqher tax rates are required to collect tha
same amount of revenue. Conaequently, although it collects the
same overall revenues, the qoverrunent has to impose higher
marqinal taxes. Accordingly, the excess burden, that is, the
loss in private income in excess of the collected revenue,
rises.
The tax-base effect (2.9) can also be written as the relative
change in real private income enjoyed by households (see also10
equation (2.4)), which is the sum of effects on real after-tax
wages and real income from tranafers and capital (see Appendix
B)
(z.lo)
Accordingly, households suffer a loss in real private income
if the tax system becomes a less efficient instrument to
finance public spending. The overall excess burden (2.7)
amounts to the sum of effecta on private income (2.4) and
environmental income (2.8).8 Thus, even thouqh households may
suffer a decline in private income due to a less efficient tax
system, they may nevertheless gain in terms of overall utility
if a rise in environmental income more than offsets the
adverse effect on private income.
3. The case without transfers and initial environmental taxes
Table III shows how the endogenous variables are affected in
the case where environmental taxes are introduced in an
equilibrium without any environmental taxes, income transfers,
and consumption out of wealth income. In the absence of income
transfers, consumption comea only out of labor income if
capital income is either absent or entirely saved. Thus, the
base of a tax on labor corresponds to that of a(uniform) tax
on consumption.9
Tax on the oollutinq consumntion commodity
The first column of Table III (the first and second rows)
BLabor supply is only dírectly affected by private income because we
have asaumed that envíronmental quality is not complementary to leisure (i.e.
o„ - oa). If envíronmental quality and private consumption are perfect
substitutes (i. e. o~ m), ín contrast, the effect on the excess burden, i.e.
the sum of the ef~ects on private real income and environmental income,
corresponds to the real-income variable that affects labor supply (2.2).
9If íncome transfers are subject to the labor íncome tax, the results
derived in this section also hold if income transfers are positive. Similarly,
consumption out of capítal income would not affect the results íf this
consumption would be taxed under the labor income tax. Thís is generally the
case for consumption out of pension wealth because pension premiums are
typically tax deductable, while pension benefits are taxed as defered labor
income. Accordingly, the conditions for the results to hold are weaker than
zero income transfers and zero consumption out of capital income, namely, the
absence of income transfers and consumption out of capital income that are
untaxed under the labor income tax. Under these conditions the base of the
labor tax coíncides with the base of the consumption tax. Hence, the first
term at the right-hand side of (3.5) would vanish.11
reveals that in this case the introduction of a small
environmental tax on households (with the revenue used to
lower the tax rate on labor) affects neither employment nor
production. Intuitively, this tax does not directly impact
production. Therefore, the marginal productivity of labor and,
therefore, the before-tax wage, Plf, and the demand for labor
remain unaffected:
The lower tax on labor income allows for a rise in the market
price of labor (i. e. the wage after labor taxes but before
(indirect) conaumption taxes), P1:
~1- - tl (3.2)
However, the wage rate that affects the incentives to supply
labor (see expression (II.9) in Table II) is not the market
waqe but the real after-tax wage (i.e. the wage after not only
labor taxes but also (indirect) consumption taxes), Pln. The
environmental tax on households drives a wedge between the
market wage and the real after-tax wage:
13j ~ F31 - (1-C~) té (3.3)
Accordingly, the wedge between the before-tax and real after-
tax wages consists of not only the distortionary tax on labor
but also the environmental tax on consumption:
P1 -~1 - tl t(Pl - P'i)- C'1 t ( 1-a~) t'á í3.4)
Whether replacing the labor tax by the environmental tax
stimulates labor supply by raisinq the real after-tax wage
depends on whether lower taxes on labor more than offset the
effect of the higher environmental tax on the overall wedge
(3.4). In order to find the cut in labor taxes made possible
by the higher environmental tax, one needs the budqet
constraint of the government:l0
lO.Phia equation followa from aubstituting (3.2) into (II.15) in Table
II and using the definition of the tax-base effect (2.9) and expression (C.9)
for the share a~nc.12
1~t1 (t'j t (1-Cc) t'é) - -(1-OIc)anlte - a~c (3.5)
Both terms at the right-hand side of ( 3.5) are zero if
employment is unaffected. The first term is zero because
transfers and consumption out of wealth income are absent
(i.e. cnl s 0). If employment remains constant, also the tax-
base effect ( 2.9) vanishes because there are no initial
environmental taxes. Accordingly, the hiqher environmental tax
exactly offsets the effect of the lower labor tax on the wedge
between the before- and after-tax real wage. Indeed, given the
constraint of revenue neutrality and the same bases for the
taxes on consumption and labor income, replacing the tax on
labor income by an indirect (environmental) tax on consumption
affects only the composition of the wedqe between before- and
after-tax wages without affecting the overall maqnitude of
this tax distortion ( see also Poterba (1991, p.19)).
Tax on the polluting invut into production
The second column of Table III provides the results for an
environmental tax on production. Also this tax leaves
employment unaffected. The reasons are as follows. The
production tax reduces the demand for polluting inputs, which
contributes to a cut in domestic production. Hence, labor
productivity falls if employment remains constant. This, in
turn, causes a decline in the before-tax wage. In particular,
the non-profit condition (II.5) yields the following
relationship between the tax on the polluting input and the
before-tax waqe:
Pt- -(aerc)Ct
i - a e
i
(3.6)
Accordingly, the input tax is borne by the immobile factor
labor; since both pollutinq inputs and capital are perfectly
mobile internationally, they can shift the entire burden of
the tax to labor.
In order to determine the impact on labor supply, we need to
examine the effect on the real after-tax wage. This effect
corresponds to that on the market wage because the
environmental tax on households, and therefore the consumption
price index, is unchanged. How the market wage is affected
depends on the balance between, on the one hand, a lower13
before-tax wage and, on the other hand, the cut in the labor
tax allowed by the additional revenues from the environmental
tax on production:
~1 ~~1 - tl z-[ t`1 t á tc to]
1
(3.7)
The public-budget constraint (Ii.15) yields the following
relationship between the cut in the tax rate on labor and the
rise in the environmental tax on production:
l~t [t1 } aát~t';] s -a~ó~ (3.8)
I 1
The tax-base effect on the riqht-hand side of (3.8) is zero if
employment does not change because the initial environmental
taxes are zero (see (2.9)). Hence, by combininq (3.7) and
(3.8), one finda that the after-tax waqe is not affected;
qiven the constraint of revenue neutrality, the adverse effect
of the lower before-tax waqe on the after-tax waqe ia exactly
offset by the positive effect oP lower taxes on labor income.
in a small open economy, substitutinq a labor tax by a tax on
polluting inputs amounts to substituting an implicit tax for
an explicit tax on labor. Hence, the overall tax burden on
labor is unaffected.
Welfare effects
Starting from an equilibrium without any environmental taxes,
the overall welfare effects of small increases in these taxes
are positive ( see Table IV). Whereas environmental taxea do
not affect employment and, therefore, the distortion in the
labor market, they do alleviate the environmental distortion
by cutting pollution. In other words, small environmental
taxes benefit the environment without affecting the capacity
of the tax system to raise revenue, as the tax-base effect is
zero.
The positive welfare effects of a lower demand for pollutinq
commodities depend on the parameters representing the strength
of the links between those demands and environmental quality.
The weiqht of the environmental quality in utility, n, also
plays an important role. Furthermore, the substitution14
elasticity between polluting and non-pollutinq commodities in
consumption, aeC, is a major determinant of the environmental
benefits from the environmental tax on consumption. The
improvement in environmental quality as a result of
environmental taxes on production depends importantly on how
easy it is to substitute other inputs for the polluting input
(i.e. the substitution elasticities in production between, on
the one hand, polluting fnpute, and, on the other hand,
capital and labor).
4. The case with positive initial environmental taxes
but no transfers
The previous section showed that, starting from a situation
without any environmental taxes, a small increase in these
taxes would not affect employment and would enhance welfare.
This result, however, holds only for very small environmental
taxes. In order to gain some insight into the effects of larqe
environmental taxes, this section explores the effects of a
marginal increase in environmental taxes, starting from an
equilibrium in which environmental taxes are positive.
4.1 Tax on the Dollutina consumption commodit..y
Effects on employment
For the case where the initial environmental taxes are
positive, Table V presents the reduced forms. Transfers and
consumption out of capital income (that are not subject to the
labor income tax) are still assumed to be absent. The first
and second rows of the firat column in Table V show that an
increase in the consumption tax on polluting commodities
reduces both employment and production if the uncompensated
wage elasticity of labor supply is positive. The rest of this
paper assumes that the labor-supply curve is indeed not
backward-bending because most empirical studies yield positive
estimates for this elasticity.ll
The negative effect on production and employment is due to a
11Estimates for the wage elasticity of labor supply for men tend to be
very small. However, the corresponding elasticity for women is generally
estimated to be positive. See, e.g., Hansson and Stuart (1985).15
reduction in the real after-tax wage and, therefore, the
incentives to supply labor. The negative effect on the real
after-tax wage comes about becausa the lower tax rate on labor
income does not Pully compensate workers for the adverse
effect of the higher environmental tax on their real after-tax
wage. This incomplete offset is due to the erosion of the base
of the environmental tax. In particular, the hiqher
environmental tax induces householda to switch from polluting
to non-polluting consumption commodities. If the initial tax
rate on the polluting commodities is positive, this behavioral
effect erodes the base of the environmental tax and,
therefore, produces a negative tax-base effect
(i.e.~~ ~ p).12 Expressions (3.4) and (3.5) indicate that, in
the absence of transfers and consumption out of capital income
(i.e. anl m 0), the replacement of labor taxes by environmental
taxes on consumption widens the wedqe between the real before-
and real after-tax waqes (i.e. ~1 -~2 ) 0) on account of this
negative effect on the tax base. Thus, if it needs to maintain
overall tax revenues, tha qovernment is unable to reduce the
labor tax sufficiently to offset the adverse effect of the
higher environmental tax on the real after-tax waqe. The
resultinq lower income írom an additional unit of work reduces
labor supply, and therefore, employment.
Parameters imnactina the adverse emolovment effect
The maqnitude of the adverse employment effect depends, apart
from the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply, on
both the initial environmental tax and the substitution
elasticity in consumption between the polluting and non-
pollutinq commodities. A higher initial tax rate atrengthens
the adverse revenue effects of the erosion of the base of the
environmental tax, thereby reducing the room to cut the tax on
labor income. This negatively affecta aftar-tax wages and,
therefore, harms the incentives to supply labor.
A higher substitution elasticity between pollutinq and non-
12In the absence of environmental externalitiea, the optimal commodity
tax structure would not differentiate between polluting and non-polluting
commodities because the utility structure implies that the aubatitutíon
elasticities between the untaxed co~odity (leisure) and the two consumption
commodities are equal. Indeed, the effect of consumption taxes on the base of
the labor tax depends only on the average tax rate on consumption and not on
how the overall tax burden is distributed over the two commodities.16
pollutinq commodities raises not only the positive effects on
environmental quality, but also the adverse effects on the
incentives to supply labor. Intuitively, it strenqthens the
erosion of the base of the environmental tax, thereby limiting
the scope to reduce taxes on labor income. Thus, a fundamental
trade-off exists between positive environmental effects and
adverse effects on the incentives to supply labor; the more
substantial the beneficial environmental effects of a given
tax on polluting consumption commodities are, the larger
become the adverse effects on the incentives to supply labor.
Another important determinant of the adverse employment effect
is the size of the public sector, which is closely related to
the term R in the denominator of the reduced form. In
particular, a larger revenue requirement due to a higher level
of public spending implies that an environmental tax yields a
larger adverse effect on employment. The reason is that the
environmental tax becomes a less effective instrument for
raising additional revenue if a larger public sector requires
higher initial tax rates on labor and the polluting
commodities. Intuitively, how effective higher environmental
tax rates are in raising additional public revenues depends on
the balance between, on the one hand, larger revenues from a
given tax base and, on the other hand, smaller revenues on
account of behavioral changes that erode the tax bases of pre-
existing taxes.
The relative importance of the second effect on revenues
depends on both the size of the initial tax rates and the
strength of the behavioral changes. In the case of a higher
environmental tax, two behavioral changes shrink the tax base.
First, as discussed above, a change in the composition of the
consumption basket away from the pollutinq commodity erodes
the base of the environmental tax. The revenue impact of this
first behavioral chanqe depends on the initial tax rate on the
polluting consumption commodity.
The second behavioral effect reducing the tax base is the
adverse employment effect. In particular, a larqer term R
(corresponding to higher initial tax rates) implies that a
fall in employment reduces revenues from labor taxes and
environmental taxes more substantially. Consequently, in the
presence of a larger public sector, which is associated with a17
larqer value for R, higher environmental taxes are less
effective in raising additional public revenue because they
harm employment and, therefore, erode the bases of higher pre-
exiating taxes. This adversely affects revenue and further
diminiahes the scope for reducing taxes on labor, thereby
negatively affecting labor-aupply incentives.l3
Welfare effecta
The overall welfare effects are qiven in Table VI. In the
'first-best' case, in which there is no need to finance public
spendinq throuqh distortíonary taxation (i.e. tl ~ 0), the
environmental tax levied on households should be set so that
it fully internalizea the external effects of pollution. This
yields the following optimality condition;l4
t' 3 ~E~~e~,
Po~ ~et,c
If the environmental tax is set at this level, a marginal
decline in the environmental tax would not affect overall
welfare if the government requires only the Pigovian tax to
finance its spendinq, so that the labor-market distortion is
absent (i.e. tl L 0). The adverse welfare effects associated
with a dirtier environment would exactly offset the positive
effects on welfare due to an expansion of the tax base. In
this 'first-best' case, labor supply and employment would rise
as a consequence of the lower environmental tax. However,
without an initial (distortionary) direct tax on labor (i.e.
tl ~ 0), higher employment would not raise welfare because the
social opportunity costs of additional employment would
exactly offset the social benefits.
13~e model is unstable if the adverse revenue effect of an eroding tax
base exceeds the positive revenue effect of a higher tax rate on a given tax
base. In that case, the government is beyond the top of the l.affer curve of
the environmental tax and det -(1-~)D - 911R ~ 0. Hence, the tax base of the
labor tax, (1-m)D, whlch captures the revenue-raising capacity of a(direct
or indirect) tax on labor income under the assumption of no behavioral
changea, is amaller than the term 9 1R, whích represents the effect of
behavioral changes ín labor supply on t~e tax ravenues from the exiating tax
system.
14~is expression does not provide for an explicit solution for the
optimal environmental tax because the terms at the right-hand side of (4.1)
depend on the tax.18
In the case where financing of public spendinq requires a
distortionary tax on labor, in contrast, overall welfare would
rise if the government would marginally reduce the
environmental tax below the level that fully internalizes the
external effects of pollution (and would, at the same time,
raise the tax rate on labor, t1, to offset the revenue
losses). Intuitively, in the first-best optimum, the
environmental benefits exactly balance the costs of the
erodinq tax base of the environmental tax itself. In a
'second-best' case, fn which distortionary taxes are required
to raise public revenue, however, one should examine not only
how the environmental tax impacts overall tax revenue through
its effect on its own base, but also how such a tax affects
overall revenue by impacting the bases of other taxes, and
thereby the capacity of the rest of the tax system to raise
revenue. In particular, in the presence of a distortionary tax
on labor, the substitution of an environmental tax for a
distortionary labor tax erodes the tax base of the labor tax
because employment declines. Thus, the environmental tax thus
reduces the capacity of the tax system to yield public
revenues over and above the revenues from the environmental
taxes themselves. Hence, reducing the environmental tax below
its 'first-best' level and replacing the revenues by labor
taxation would raise welfare because it would alleviate the
distortions associated with the financing of public goods.
Compared to the 'first-best' case, therefore, the optimal
environmental tax would fall if a distortionary tax on labor
were needed to finance public spending. Indeed, a Pigovian
tax, which is set at a level to fully internalize the
environmental damage, is suboptimal in the presence of
distortionary taxes aimed at raising revenue. This arqument
resembles that of Buchanan (1972), who argued that a Pigovian
tax may not be optimal if a polluting commodity is supplied by
a monopolist. Whereas Buchanan dealt with the market
imperfection of a monopoly power, this paper focusses on a tax
distortion in the labor market. In both cases, however, market
imperlections tend to reduce the optimal size of the
environmental tax as compared to the 'first-best' case in
which distortiona other than the environmental externalities
are absent.
If the environmental tax is set below its 'first-best' optimum
(i.e. the right-hand side of (4.1) exceeds the left-hand19
side), a higher tax yields ambiguous welfare effects because
it reduces not only pollution but also employment. On the one
hand, a hiqher environmental tax enhances welfare by reducing
pollution and alleviating the environmental distortion. On the
other hand, however, the tax harms welfare by reducing
employment, thereby worsening the labor-market distortion.
Indeed, this is a classic second-best result; reducing one
distortion in an economy with remaining distortions does not
necessarily yield positive welfare effects.
A higher revenue requirement, which corresponds to hiqher
values for R and tl, reduces the beneficial welfare effects of
replacing a labor tax by an environmental tax on households.
First, as explained above, a larger public sector, which
implies a hiqher value for R(and, therefore, a smaller
denominator (i.e. det) in the reduced forms), exacerbates the
negative impact of a higher environmental tax on the
incentives to supply labor. The reason is that the negative
employment effects yield larger adverse effects on tax revenue
iP initial tax rates are high, thereby reducing the scope to
reduce the tax rate on labor. Second, a higher initial tax
rate tl raises the relative importance of the labor-market
distortion, and, therefore, increases the adverse welfare
effects due to a fall in employment.
4.2 Tax on the pollutina inout into oroduction
Effects on emplovment
As reqards the environmental tax levied on inputs into
production, the first row in the second column of Table V
reveals that also this tax harms employment. In fact, the
reduced form for employment resembles that corresponding to an
environmental tax on households; both the initial rate of the
environmental tax and the revenue requirement raise the
adverae employment effect. Here, the relevant aubstitution
elasticity, al~, ia a composite of the substitution
elasticities in production.
Just as in the case of a tax on households, the negative
effect on employment oriqinates in a fall in the real after-
tax waqe and the associated adverse effects on the incentives
to supply labor. The reason for the decline in the marginal
income from work is that the production tax reduces the demand20
for polluting inputs. This adversely affects real labor income
throuqh two channels. First, as explained in the previous
section, it decreases the marginal productivity of labor and,
therefore, the before-tax wage. Secondly, the hiqher
environmental tax erodes its own base. If the ínitial tax rate
on the polluting input is positive, the smaller tax base
reduces revenue, thereby producinq a negative tax-base effect
(i.e.b~~p). Accordinqly, given the constraint of revenue
neutrality, the government cannot cut the tax rate on labor
income sufficiently to fully offset the adverse effect of the
fall in before-tax waqes on the after-tax waqe. Indeed,
expressions (3.7) and (3.8) reveal that the after-tax wage
declinea if the tax base of the initial tax system shrinks
(i.e. ~~~0).15 High initial tax rates (i.e. a high value of
R) exacerbate the adverse revenue effects of the fall in
employment.
Welfare effects
The welfare effects of the production tax are contained in
Table VI. Just as in the case of an environmental tax on
consumption, a trade-off exists between environmental benefits
and the worsening of the tax distortion in the labor market on
account of a smaller tax base. The effect on the labor-market
distortion is small if firms have little scope to substitute
capital and labor for polluting inputs (i.e. ol~ is small). In
that case, however, also the environmental benefits are small.
A fundamental conflict thus exists between the objectives of
improving environmental quality and minimizing the costs of
financing public spending.
The relative importance of the effect on the labor-market
distortion depends importantly on the overall revenue
requirement. Accordingly, a higher level of public spending
reduces the welfare qains from switching from labor to
environmental taxation. Indeed, such a change in the tax mix
may harm welfare, even though the initial environmental tax is
15Accordíngly, directly taxing labor yields a higher after-tax wage than
taxing labor indirectly by taxing the pollutíng inputs into production. The
reason is that the tax on the mobile inputs is borne by immobile labor.
Furthermore, unlike a direct tax on labor income, the input tax distorts the
production process, at least if one abstracts from the environmental benefits.
This resulC ís closely related to that derived by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).
They show that aggregate production efficiency is desirable in the presence
of optimal commodity taxation. See also Gordon ( 1986).21
below the level that fully internalizes the external costs of
pollution (1.e. (tef~petf) ~ ~emf(opq~oeft))-
4.3 Environmental taxes: no double dividend
These results imply that the 'double-dividend' story fails.
Pre-existing tax distortions in the labor market reduce rather
than enhance the attractiveneas of environmental policy, in
general, and of a heavy reliance on environmental taxes, in
particular. The fundamental reason for this second-best
results is that the environment is a collective good; all
residents benefit--irrespective of the amount of labor they
supply. indeed, an improvement in the environment can be
interpreted as an increase in the supply of collective goods.
All public goods, including the cleaner environment, are
ultimately paid for by the immobile production factor, labor.
Hence, the costs associated with a cleaner environment further
reduce the incentives to supply labor at the marqin, thereby
contracting the base of the labor tax and raising the marginal
efficiency costs of financing (other) public spending.
In particular, environmental taxes reduce after-tax wages on
two accounts. First, labor pays for the public qoods supplied
by the government, as all taxes required to finance public
spending are ultimately borne by labor.lb Second, from the
point of view of financing public spending with the least
costs to real after-tax wages, environmental taxes do not tax
labor 'efficiently;' they not only reduce the after-tax wage,
but also 'distort' either the composition of the consumption
basketl~ or the production process. Althouqh these
'distortions' reduce the real after-tax income from work, they
also do contribute to a higher environmental quality. The
positive welfare effecta associated with higher environmental
quality, however, are public and independent of labor supply.
In this way, the costs of improvinq the environment are borne
by marqinal labor eupply. Thus, labor pays not only for the
16If transfers and consumption out of capital income would be positive,
tranafers and wealth owners could bear part of this burden. See Sectíon V.
17In the absence of environmental externalities, the optimal commodity
tax structure would tax polluting and non-polluting commodities uniformly. See
footnote 13 above.22
public goods provided throuqh the public budqet but also for
the costs incurred by the private sector in improving
environmental quality. Indeed, the use of environmental taxes
implies that the private sector, in fact, provides the
collective good of the environment. Accordinqly, the costs of
'producinq' the collective good of hiqher environmental
quality do not feature on the government budget and are,
therefore, 'hidden.'
These results are consistent with the optimal-tax results
derived in a partial-equilibrium framework by Sandmo (1975).
This study analyses the case of a government employing its tax
system to simultaneously achieve two objectives: first, to
satisfy its revenue requirement and, second, to internalize
external effects. It derives the optimal-tax rate for an
externality-creating commodity as the weighted average of two
terms: first, the marginal social damaqe of the polluting
commodity and, second, an inverse elasticity formula familiar
from the theory of optimal taxation. The weight of the
marginal social damage decreases as the revenue requirement
increases. Intuitively, an environmental tax reduces pollution
by inducing taxpayers to evade taxee. Tax evasion not only
reduces pollution, however, but also requires the government
to levy higher distortionary taxes to finance its own
spending. Accordingly, the larger the qovernment's revenue
needs are (and hence the higher the distortionary taxes need
to be), the less the goverrunent can afford tax differentiation
aimed at environmental protection. Indeed, marginal tax
revenue becomes more valuable if the government has to rely on
distortionary taxes to finance its spending. The optimal
environmental tax balances the social costs of pollution
against the social benefits from additional tax revenues.
Therefore, the hiqher the social value attached to tax
revenue, the higher the marginal social costs of pollution
have to be to justify environmental taxes. There exists thus a
basic conflict between using the tax system to achieve the
twin objectives of raising revenue and improving environmental
quality.23
5. The case with nositive transfers but no initial
environmental taxes
This section explores the effects of environmental taxes if
the qovernment provides poeitive income transfers (that are
not subject to the labor income tax) or if consumption out of
capital income is positive (and not taxed under the labor
income tax). In order to clearly identify the impact of
positive transfers and consumption out of capital income on
the results, it is assumed that the initial environmental
taxes are zero. The first column in Table VII contains the
reduced forms in case the environmental tax on households is
raised, starting from this particular initial equilibrium. The
reduced forms corresponding to the introduction of an
environmental tax on firms are not included in Table ViI; the
existence of positive transfers and consumption out of capital
income does not alter the effects of this tax compared to the
corresponding reaults without transfers described in Section 3
(see the second column of Table III). In particular,
employment is unaffected.
Effects on emoloyment
The environmental tax on households, in contrast, does affect
employment if transfers are positive (see the first row in the
first column of Table VII). In contrast to the case without
transfers, employment and production increase while the real
after-tax wage rises. Zntuitively, the government is able to
more than compensate workers for the adverse effect of the
environmental taxes on the real after-tax wage. indeed,
expressions (3.4) and (3.5) reveal that, as lonq as the tax
base doea not erode (f.e.~~2p, see below), the gap between
before- and real after-tax wages declines if consumption out
of non-labor income is positive (i.e. onl ~ 0). The reason is
that the base of a consumption tax is broader than that of a
labor tax if consumption exceeds labor income. Thie enables
the government to reduce the tax rate on wage income by more
than the increase in the averaqe tax rate on consumption,
thereby reducing the overall tax wedge between the before-tax
and real after-tax wage. In fact, workers shift part of the
burden of the environmental tax to transfer recipients and
owners of financial wealth, who suffer a fall in the real
value of their income. if the initial environmental taxes are
zero, the tax base expands on account of higher labor supply.za
Hence, the government can reduce the tax rate even further
(see expression (3.5)).
Effects on efficiency and equity
The welfare effects in Table VIII reveal that the
environmental tax on consumption typically yields a double
dividend if the tax reduces pollution.18 Besides cutting
pollution, this tax also reduces the labor-market distortion
by expanding employment.
Whereas efficiency is typically improved, the lower real value
for income transfers suggests that society may face a cost in
terms of equity. In fact, the government can alleviate the
labor-market distortion only by cutting the real value of
transfers and wealth income. If the government aimed at
maintaining the real value of public transfers and consumption
out of capital income, it would have to raise transfers by:
~ - (1-R~) Wnlte
Combining this result with the reduced forms for a change in
transfers contained in the second column of Table VII, one
finds that the higher labor tax required to finance this
increase in transfers would exactly offset the positive effect
of the tax replacement on the after-tax wage.l9
These results illustrate that the government typically faces a
trade-off in the use of revenues between efficiency and
iBIt is theoretically possible that an environmental tax increases
pollution due to a positive income effect associated with lower labor-market
distortions. This income effect may be atrong enough to offset the
substitution effect of a higher environmental tax on the demand for polluting
consumption commodities. Thís case is highly unlikely because it requires not
only a rather small substitution elasticity between polluting and non-
polluting Snputs but also large values for both the wage elasticity of labor
supply and the íncome elasticity of polluting consumption commodities. If
pollutíon rises, the overall welfare effect may even be negative. This case
is even more unlikely, however, as the initial labor tax should be small
relative to the environmental distortion. This extreme case íllustrates the
theorem of the second best: reducing the labor-market distortion does not
necessaríly enhance welfare as long as the environmental distortion remains.
L9The change in the tax mix would also not affect employment if the
income transfers and consumption out of wealth income were subject to the
labor income tax. In that case, the base of the labor income tax would be just
as wide as that of a consumption tax. Indeed, the real value of transfers and
wealth income would be unaffected by the tax substítution as the higher
environmental tax would be offset by lower labor income taxes on transfers and
consumed capital income (see also Section 3).25
equity, as the double dividend can only be reaped at the costs
of a negative dividend, namely, more inequity as the real
value of transfers is cut.20 Indeed, the government generally
does not require environmental taxes to achieve the efficiency
gains that are associated with a different income distribution
due to lower transfers. In terms of our model, for example,
the government can reap the efficiency gains more directly by
reducing public transfers, by subjectinq these transfers to
the labor-income tax, or by replacing a tax on labor income by
a broad-based tax on conaumption.
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) employ a dynamic model with
capital accumulation and overlapping generations to examine
the replacement of labor taxation by consumption taxation.
Their simulation results reveal a similar trade-off between
efficiency and equity. In particular, the efficiency gains of
a shift toward consumption taxation come at the expense of a
lower real value of financial wealth, which is mainly owned by
the older generations. The elderly, therefore, suffer.
Intuitively, in the dynamic model of Auerbach and Kotlikoff
(1987), the consumption tax can be viewed as consisting of two
components: first, an unanticipated capital levy on financial
wealth that has been accumulated in the past, and, second, a
tax on labor income. The first component is non-distortionary
because the owners of the wealth cannot escape the unexpected
tax by changing their behavior. Whereas the implicit lump-sum
tax on financial wealth enhances overall efficiency, it has a
price in terms of intergenerational equity, as older
qenerations suffer a major loss in welfare. The government can
achieve these efficiency gains also more directly by
expropriating (part of) the financial wealth accumulated by
the elderly.
6. Extensions
The analysie in this paper could be extended in several
directions. An extention Pavorable to the double-dividend
argument, at least from the point of view of national welfare,
would be to relax the small-economy assumptions by reducing
the deqree of international mobility of commodities, polluting
inputs and capital. This would enable the country to shift
20See also Pearson and Smith (1991, p. 48).26
some of the burden of the environmental taxes onto the foreign
country by chanqing the terms of trade. From the point of view
of global welfare, this would merely amount to redistributing
income away from foreigners toward domestic residents. Whether
this would actually improve global efficiency would depend on
the distortions and behavioral responses, both domestically
and abroad.21 The introduction of non-tradables would leave
the distribution between foreigners and domestic residents
unaffected. However, it would change the distribution between
labor and non-labor incomes. In particular, labor would bear a
larger share of environmental taxes on households because
these taxes would reduce producer prices. Pollution taxes on
firms would in part be shifted to households, thereby
increasing the burden on non-labor incomes and reducing that
on labor.
Similarly, if the country were in a position to affect the
world interest rate, an environmental tax on production may be
borne in part by savers. Whether this would improve overall
efficiency would depend on, among other things, both the
elasticity of saving and the existing taxes on capital
income.22 An analysis of these issues would require a dynamíc
model with capital accumulation. Modelling overlapping
generations within such an intertemporal framework would allow
one to deal with issues of intertemporal efficiency and
intergenerational equity related to both the timing of taxes
and lags between emissions and environmental quality.
Other extensions would be unfavorable to the double-dividend
argument. To illustrate, other labor-market imperfections,
such as real-wage rigidities, would tend to raise the costs of
environmental taxes. Furthermore, the quality of the
environment could be made complementary to leisure. [In that
21It is híghly unlikely that the industrialized countries would be able
to shift the costs of the environmental policies to the LDCs. In contrast, the
industrialized countries most likely would have to bríbe the LDCs to
participate ín international agreements on global and continental
environmental problems. Hence, workers in industrialized countries are likely
to bear a substantial part of the burden of cutting pollution in not only the
índustrial countries but also the LDCs.
22Workers may bear the burden of a lower return on capital in countries
with large collective funded pension funds that are based on the defíned-
benefit principle. In these countries, a lower return to capital would require
higher pensíon premiums on the working population.z7
case, the substitution elasticity between the quality of the
environment and private commoditiea would exceed the
substitution elasticity between leisure and the composite of
private commodities and environmental services]. In that case,
an improvement in environmental quality would reduce the
supply of labor throuqh another channel. In modelling terms, a
higher environmental quality would be included in the income
effect in the equation for labor supply (see equation (II.9)
in Table II). Hence, the adverse effects of environmental
taxes on employment increase as the relevant wage elasticity
of labor supply may be closer to the uncompensated than to the
compensated elasticity.
In the spirit of Sandmo (1975), the model could also be used
to compute optimal tax and expenditure policies by introducing
many heterogeneous householda and a social welfare function
that depends on both the supply oP public goods and the income
distribution.
Finally, one could use the framework to analyze alternative
instruments of environmental policy, such as subsidies and
public spending on pollution abatement.
7. Conclusions
This paper suggests that second-best considerations play an
important role in settinq environmental policy, in general,
and in implementing environmental taxes, in particular.
Whereas Suchanan (1972) pointed this out for the case of a
monopolist supplying a pollutinq commodity, this paper
explores how tax distortions associated with the financing of
public spendinq impact the effects of environmental policy. it
demonstrates that an increase in environmental taxes toward a
level that fully internalizes the social costs of pollution
may no lonqer be welfare improving if the qovernment requires
distortionary taxes to finance its spending. Oates and Schwab
(1988) also hiqhlight the interaction between environmental
policy and tax distortions. They show that, from the point of
view of global efficiency, communities that require high
distortionary taxes on mobile capital should set relatively
lax environmental standards. This would serve to offset theza
distortions introduced by fiscal policy.23
High estimates for the marginal efficiency costs of the
existing tax system are sometimes used in support of
environmental taxes (see e.g. Pearce (1991)). This paper has
shown that such arguments are misleadinq because they ignore
the costs of environmental taxes in terms of exacerbating the
pre-existing distortions associated with the financing of
public spending throuqh distortionary taxation. In particular,
environmental taxes typically render the tax structure a less
efficient instrument for raising revenue and, therefore,
increase the welfare costs of financing public spending. The
additional costs of environmental taxes due to less efficient
revenue-raising are likely to be especially high if the
marginal efficiency costs of the existing tax system are
substantial. Therefore, the higher the efficiency costs of the
existing tax structure are, the higher the environmental
benefits need to be in order to justify the additional costs
of environmental taxes in terms of a less efficient mechanism
for financing public spending. Zndeed, high estimates for the
efficiency costs of existing taxes weaken rather than
strenathen the case for environmental taxation.
A hiqher priority for the public good of environmental quality
is likely to require a heavier reliance on environmental
taxes. This change in the tax structure, however, typically
raises the marginal efficiency costs of financinq public
spending, especially if environmental taxes are successful in
reducing pollution. Intuitively, environmental taxes increase
the supply of environmental services, thus boosting the
overall supply of public goods, and therefore raising the
marginal costs of public goods provisfon more generally. In
this way, the public good of a cleaner natural environment
directly competes with other public qoods.24
One way to avoid higher efficiency costs of raising public
z3In the context of policy competition, Oates and Schwab (1988) also
found that competing jurisdictions set inefficiently low environmental
standards if these communities have to rely on a tax on mobile capital to
finance their public spending.
24The condition of the natural environment in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union provides a dramatic example of this. In these countries,
a large public sector has crowded out a clean environment.29
revenue is to cut public spending in order to reduce the
overall revenue requirement. This option is illustrated by the
analysis of the double dividend in Section V. In that section,
environmental taxes raise rather than reduce the efficiency of
the tax system as a revenue-raisinq device. This is because
society buya a higher environmental quality by lowering the
real value of public transfers.
An alternative way to prevent environmental policy from
raisinq the (marqinal) efficiency costs of public spending is
to chanqe the income distribution, thereby possibly neqatively
affectinq equity--for example, by shifting the economic burden
of the higher supply of public goods to the elderly or those
receiving government transfers (aee Section V). Indeed, the
services from the environmental quality are not free. On the
contrary, since these services are public, they are
expensive--especially in those countries with large public
sectors that require high distortionary taxes. A cleaner
environment, as with all qood things, comes with a pricetaq: a
lower supply of (other) public qoods, a different income
distribution, or a more distortionary tax system and a less
efficient labor market.30
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Tabla I (continuad): Notation
Y ~ supply of the domestic commodity
Iy - domestic labor demand
K - domestic demand for capital services
Ef - domestic demand for pollutinq inputs
Py - price of commodity Y
Pif - before-tax wage rate
ti - ad valorem tax rate on labor income
P~ - after-tax wage rate
price of polluting inputs faced by firms
market price of polluting inputs
specific tax rate on polluting inputs
household demand for leisure
- lagrange multiplier in the household maximization problem
- labor supply
- lump-sum transfers of the qovernment to households
- financial wealth, owned by domestic households
- rate of return net of exogenous growth rate
- environmental quality
intermediate private consumption bundle of commodities
price level of Q
consumption of the polluting commodity by households
consumption of the "clean" commodity by households
price of the non-pollutinq consumption commodity
- price of the polluting commodity faced by households
market price of the polluting consumption commodity
tax rate on the polluting consumption commodity
public demand in real terms
price of public goods36
Tabl~ Ii: The model (in relative changes)
The firms
Supply of domestic commodity Y
y ' a1Ld } ~eftEf t ~rlcK
Labor demand
Ld - Y t oin (aefc (P'c -P'i) ` xrk (Yn - Pi) )
Demand for capital services
ÏC - Y t o1nal IPi - fnl
y aefc
~Oek - ~1n~1~ (Pt - ~n)
~afc t ark
Demand for polluting inputs
Ef - Y t ol~acl [Pi - PC~]
~ ~rk




Pr - a1P1 } aetcpec } ~rk~n
Before-tax wage rate
Pl - Pi a t1
Price of pollutinq inputs faced by firms
PBC - (1-te~Pec)Pe ` te
The households
Budget constraint for households
PQ t Q - (1-~n1) (P~ t La) } ~ t ~tv(~n ' ~
Labor supply
La - e11Pi - e1 (S - ~n1Pq) - ~M
Demand for the "non polluting" commodity by households






Demand for the pollutinq commodity by households
Ëh - I'of~ ; a~o~(!3o-P';t)
Price level of consumer bundle
Ëa - a~~ ` (1-a~)P~
Real after-tax wage
(II.11)
P1 - Pl - P'a ( I I. 13)
Price of "non-polluting" consumption commodity faced by
households
PBt - (1-tsrPst) ~Po } to
Government
Balanced budqet
aP9(P9 } ~) } aP~ - ~eftte } aehtts } altl






y t Py - a.h(Ëh t P'e) t aBr(Ér ` PB) t arx(1~ { Pn)





M - - 6~rËf - 6~Ëh (II.18)
Endoqenous:
Exoqenous:
Yr Ld~ K. Ef. Plf. Petf. Q. Ih. Eht Ct Pq. Pl~. Petht
t~, P~, M
Pá -Pó -Ï'~-Py-~~-Py-G~-W-O
C~ - C: - S 2 03a
Tabl~ II (coatinued): Notatioa
As far as mentioned in the líst for the model in levels the
symbols are not explained here.












- substitution elasticity between capital services and
polluting inputs in production
- substitution elasticity between polluting and "non-
polluting" commodities in consumption
a„ - substitution elasticity between leisure and intermediate
utility H
aq - substitution elasticity between environmental quality
and the intermediate consumption bundle Q in consumption
I'e - income elasticity of polluting consumption commodities
I'~ - income elasticity of "non-polluting" consumption
commodities
9i - minus the income elasticity of labor supply
9~,f - minus the elasticity that measures the relative chanqe in
the environmental quality as a consequence of a relative
change in the demand for polluting inputs
A,d, - minus the elasticity that measures the relative change in
the environmental quality as a consequence of a relative
change in the demand for polluting commodities
~ - aU~aM M the marginal rate of substitution between M and av~aQó
Q times the ratio between M and Q39




~ Al~a~ compensated price elasticity of labor supply
~ [611~ - (1-~nl)0l] uncompensated price elasticity of
labor supply
i - 1 t~~- ~~ e2 a term that measures the impact of a higher
environmental quality on labor supply
f s (1 - a„~aq)
l' ~rk ~eft ~ln
Q - [ OBk t ]
azktaott ~zk;aeft aI
D - roaaA } rcapc -~eA ; aOC }(1-re) Yrh 1 0
R s r2 t Qel t ro(i-.ynll paA ~ 0
det -(1-~n~ ) D - ellR ~ 0
Remark
There are 18 equations with 16 endogenous variables. This means
that two equations are dependent. One equation, (II.17), is due
to Walras law. The other one is the equation for production














PetfEfI PyY - [(P~f t tef ) Ef ) IpyX
r„IC~PyY
PtfLlpyY - (1 t ti)piL~pyy
PqQIPyY a ( PcC t PethEh) IpyY
Petk~IPyY -[(P~h t teh) Eh] IPyY
PcC~pYY ~c
3~ PyY oat
(S t rnW) ~PyY - tYs t~r~

























acaehellaec - ~ 0
det
Y t Í1-Kc)~n1~11 ~ 0 -~efcQln C 0
det al
- ~caehellaec ~ o perellai
det - det ~ o
i 1-Cc) ~nl~ll -Oi ( 0 Éf } ~ ~
det
perellai p









C o -41 t Qek
det ~o ~0
-re~l-~nl) ~ltell)reh~c~ec C O re~l-~nl) ~ltell)M fdl
Êh det
e
- det ~ o
-acaeC ~ 0
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~ det ~ o
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asrt - t 0
al
tl
~ acr'eh0ar ~ O
det
aeft
- ~ o al
(1-ac) ~D- ( 611-~n191) R1
- ~ o
.
p a det l ~ 0 t 'r
det
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de t mf" 11 } det ~ [8 }
emh(altPer)re] C o e,nnI'e(1-~n1) (ltell)] ~
T~ 1' eha c~ ec
` [emrell }
}
t ~8mrai ~ 0
det
9~re (1-~n1) ( 1 t611) ] ) 0
` q9,m,acaec ~ 0
D - i'~a~ t r~aa
R - B~ f B~r t r~ (1-~,~) B~
det - (1-~~,)D - 9„R
ark aaft Qln t
al - ark 4 ae([Oek ark'} aefC al42
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'1) `~le~na~aec ~ ~ s a~ t o
~re(altPef) (1-a~)~nl
det
. e;,nem,, ~ o
t~e~fÉf -~9mr
a~edethoeC ~ a -~1emr~ edetf } ll ai ~ 0
(1-~c)~nl~li~o t~emf
det
~ - -~p - i7" - -(1-~n1)Pj - S' t t)9AfÊf t ~B~Ëh44
l~ppendiz a: Analytical solution of the raduced form equationa.
Labor demand
First we write equation (II.17) for the case where the prices of
tradables do not change and G' - W- 0:
y- aahEh t aerEf t arkK t a~C (A1)
Using (A1) and the equation for the supply of goods (II.1), one
can eliminate y`:
a 1L'd -- PNtÊ f' aaeËh t a~.C' (A2)
Here we have used relation (C12) from appendix C. Equation (A2)
can be interpreted as an expression for labor demand. We now
express the three endogenous variables on the right-hand side of
equation (A2) in terms of L and P'1.
To find the expression for Êf, we first subtract (II.2) from
(IZ.4) and use (II.7) to eliminate P'~. If the prices for
tradables do not change, this yields:
E'. f- L t o P e ark aerc r
d ln 1 -~ Qek t ~ln~ te
aefc'ark aefc;ark
(A3)






Subtituting (A4) into (A3) to eliminate p'!f, one derives:
Ëf -L-oÍté (A5)
where al - f ark oex ' aeec oin ) (A6)
arktaefc arktaerc al45
To find C and Éh in terms of P1 and L, we eliminate p' in
(II.10) and (II.11) by substituting the household
budgetconstraint (II.B):
C- rc[ (1-~n1) (P1tL~ t 5' -(1-ac) C'6] t(1-ac) a~Cé (A7)
Eh - re[ (1-~nl) (P'ItL~ t .Si - (1-ac) Cé) - ac0ecte (A8)
Here, we have assumed that consumption out of financial wealth
does not change: W' -~n - 0. We have used the price equations
(II.12) and (II.14) to rewrite Pv and p~ in terms of
Substituting (A5), (A7), and (A8) into (A2) one derives:
aiL - [aehra t a~cl [ (1-~nl) (P'1tL7 t S - (1-ac) Ed]
- F'afL t Refalte t[ ( 1-ac) a~ - acaeh] aecte
tá
(A9)
Using the definition of the shares (C7), (C9) and (C11) in
appendix C, we can write the last term in square brackets at the
riqht-hand side of (A9) as:
[ (1-ac) a~ - acaeh] - acRen (A70)
Using (A10), we can now rewrite labor demand in (A9) as:
[a1tF'ef-(1-~nl) (aeltetapc~c))L'- Refalte t ac1'ahaecte
t[aehretq~`c] [(1-~nl) P~ i S- ( 1-ac) CéI
(All)
We can seperate the last term in square brackets at the right-
hand side of (All) in an effect on the real after-tax waqe,P`Í,
and an effect on real income from transfers and capital income,
S'' .
(1-~nl) P] ' S- (1-ac) Cá -(1-~n1) P1 i Sv. (A12)
where 5" - S - mn1PQ - ~ - ~nI (1-ac) Eé (A13)
P1n-P'1 -P'q-P'1 - (1-ac)EB (A14)
We also define:46
D-~aehre 4 apc~c) - ~eh 4 6~ t (1-re) Meh
- ~,Q - r.Pe,, ~ o
R - ~1 } Yef - (1-Wnl) sD
- rl } Yef t re(1-~nl) 1'eh ~ 0
(A15)
(A16)
Here we have used the relationships between the shares contained
in appendix C. The term D in (A15) measures real after-tax
expenditure of households as a result of additional employment.
R in (A16) represents the marginal size of the public sector,
i.e. the additional tax revenue due to an additional unit of
employment. Substituting (A12), (A15), and (A16) into (All), we
derive:
R~L -(1-~nl)DePj - D~kS't CócQehaecte t F'ef~lte (A17)
Labor supplv
Assuming j~-0, and using (A13), one can write labor supply (II.9)
as:
Ls - etlPln - 91S' (A18)
Eauilibrium emplovment
We write (A17) and (A18) in matrix notation as:
I R
-(1-eti)D) ( Pi 1
p th
r ~c~eh~ec ref41 0 ~ e
1 0 0 -81 ~-e
S''
(A19)
We can solve for the endoqenous variables by inverting the matrix
on the left-hand side of (A19):
t h
Pl - I-811 (1-Rnl) D) I ~c óeh~ec p
e0 1 -B ~ I e
det( n~ 11 ` t f A20
1 S
det - (1-~n~)D - 9~~R 1 0 (A21)
The term "det" must be positive for the equilibrium to be stable.
This determinant consists of two elements. The first term on the
right-hand side of (A21) can be interpreted as the real value of
after-tax wage income. This net private income constitutes the
tax base for the public sector. The second term stands for the
impact of higher real after-tax wages on tax revenues through its47
behavioral effect on labor supply and, therefore, the base of the
tax system. If 9i~ and R are large relative to (1-~~i)D, the
economy may be unstable. Intuitively, a lower real after-tax wage
may turn the economy into a downward spiral. Thia is because
lower after-tax wages reduce the incentive to supply labor,
thereby reducing tax revenues through an erosion of the tax base.
Hence, the tax on labor needs to rise in order to meet the
revenue constraint. This further reduces net wages and,
therefore, the tax base. The instability due to a negative slope
of the 'Laffer curve,' can only occur if the public sector is
large relative to net private income (i.e. R is larqe relative
to (1-~~~)D). Moreover, private behavior should be sensitive to
tax incentives (i.e. 9ii is large).
The reduced form equations for P'1 and L can now be computed from
(A20):
det~L'- -621Ds,5' - elt~enacaecte - eilaera~ta (A22)
dettp" -ID t 9 R]. h f 1 z 1 ~~ - penacasofa - aeraite (A23)
Equation (A22) features the compensated, rather than the
uncompensated, wage elasticity of labor supply. The former
elasticity is linked to the latter as follows:
el, - el, t(1-~nl)81 2 0 (A24)
Other reduced forms
The other reduced-form equations can now be derived. For ~f one
can find the reduced form equation from (A5), by substituting
(A22) for L.
We use (II.12), (II.13), and (II.14) to find the reduced form for
P1
Pi - Pj t (1-Ot~) Cé (A25)
In order to express ~h and ~ in terms of the exoqenous
variables, one substitutes (A22) and the reduced form for P1 into
(A7) and (A8) respectively.48
For the endoqenous tax rate on labor, t1, we use (II.6):
EZ - P'if - P'1 (A2 6)
Substituting plf from ( A4) and the reduced form for P`2 into
(A25), one arrives at the reduced form equation for t'1.
The demand for capital services can be rewritten by subtracting
( II . 3) from ( II. 2). I f we substitute ( II . 7) and (A4 ) for P'~ and p'1f
respectively, we find:
K-Lt (aex-ai)[B (A27)
By sustituting (A22) into (A27), one arrives at the reduced form
for K.
Finally, substituting (A4) and (II.7) into (II.2), we derive the
following equation for y`:




One arrives at the reduced form for y by substituting (A22)
into (A28).49
71pp~ndiz 8 T~s ~xceas burdan
In analoqy of Keller (1980), we compute the 'marginal' excess
burden as the compensating variation, which is defined as the
transfer necessary to maintain, after a policy change, utility
at its original level. For small changes, the compensatinq
variation equals the equivalent variation.
Accordingly, we find the compensating transfer such that, after
the policy shock, utility U[V,E",C,M] is unchanged compared to
the initial equilibrium, i.e.
0- dU - ávdv t~CdC t aE ~h } c3M~ (Bl)
Utility maximization implies that the partial derivatives at the
riqht hand side of ( B1) are equal to b, the lagrange multiplier
corresponding to the budqet constraint, times the corresponding
price (see (I.10), (I.11) and ( I.12)). Hence, we write ( B1) as:
-.lPIdL t ÀP~dC t ~lPÍdE" f ~MdM - 0 (82)
where we have used dL --dV.
From the household budgetconstraint ( I.9) we have:
L.dPI t P1tdL t dS t Wtdln t InsdW . d~i
- C~dP~ t P~~dC t Eh~dP~ t P~~dE~
(B3)
Here dB is the compensating variation. Substituting (B2) into
(B3), one arrives at the following expression for dB:
d(~ - -dS - zn.dW - W~drn - L:dPI
t CkdPn t Eh~dP~- aU dM
c3M A
(B4)
We define the (marginal) excess burden,(j, as the compensatinq
variation, dB, relative to household income. Therefore, we divide
(B4) by PqQ, which yields for the excess burden:
Q - -S' - (1-~n1)P'1 t (1-o~n) Eé - (~Mr~Q) ~M (B5)
where we have used (II.14) , aU~c3Q -.1Pq, and dr~ - dW - dP~ - 0.
Alternatively, using (II.12), (II.13), (IZ.14), (II.18) and the
definition of real transfers (2.5), we can write the excess
burden as:50
~--S'' -(1-~n1) Pi t T) ( e,~Éh i eIDtÈ f) ( B6)
Here we used the definition of n.
In order to derive the expression for the excess burden in (2.6),
we use the public budgetconstraint (II.15) with L7fl - G' - 0:
rl L y F'efÈ.t t Meh~sh -
á~ a~ a~
- rl p - aef[ t f - aeh[
t h - ~1 t 4 S a 1 a B a e a 1 va v4 vq na
From (II.5), (II.6) and (II.7) we derive:
~1 t-- al P' - aarc ~ c
a i- a j a e va av aa
Substituting (BS) into (B7) to eliminate P1, one finds:





Here we have used (C6), (C8), (C13) and (C16) to rewrite the
shares in the initial equilibrium. The left-hand side of (B9) is,
according to (A12) and ( 2.4), equal to bp. According to (2.9)
the right-hand side equals 6t. Hence, (2.10) holds.51
App~ndix C: eharos
This appendix derives a number of relationships between the
shares in the initial equilibrium:
1. From the non-profit condition (I.5):
~rk t aeft t al - 1~ (C1)
2. From the household budgetconstraint (I.9):
oa t aet,t - a~ t as t ary - a~ t a„i - aay
3. From the government budgetconstraint (I.14):
(C2)
~pg }~s - get t Reh t Al (C3)
Using these relationships, one can write all the shares in
terms of ti, tef~Pet, tehlPeh~ ai, ac. as. ant and ark.
aerc-l - a1 -ark
al
aD4 - aPt t anl - 1,~ t } anl
1
a ]
aa - a~ay~ - a~[ 1 lt t anl
t 1
aenc - ( 1 - ac) a~ - (1 - a~) [ 1 alt t an1]
Z








a,f - (1-té~Pst)astt - (1-t,~P,~) (1-al-ark)
r.h - aehc-aeh - (t.IPst)a,ht - (t~,P.c) (1-a~) [ l~t
1





(ts~P~) (1-a~) [ lat tanl] t(te~Pó)( 1-al-ark) t i}CI - a9
1 1
arw - aln - ae
anl anl(lftl)
~1n - apq - al t (lttl)anl
,1, anl - a8 - Ianl-a8) (lttl)
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